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January 10, 1986 Conference CJt--1
List 1, sheet 1

y.

85-701

~'

y/FEDERAL ELECTION COMMN.

1-J~~

Appeal
om CAl (Rosenn-SCJ,
Breye , Torruella)

v.
MASS. CITIZENS FOR LIFE, INC.
(corporate speaker)

1.

SUMMARY:

Fed./Civ.

Timely

The Federal Election Commission (FEC)

challenges the CAl's decision that 2

u.s.c.

§44lb, which

of a candidate in connection with a federal election, was
unconstitutional as applied to a nonprofit, "ideological"
corporation making indirect, uncoordinated expenditures to
express its views of candidates.
2.

FACTS AND DECISIONS BELOW:

Campaign Act (FECA), 2

u.s.c.

The Federal Election

§44lb(a), makes it unlawful for a

N b~ f'>rb~C<.\o\,e_. J Ull~\ c+-to-N

Mtk

-

2 -

corporation
"to make a contribution or expenditure in connection
with any election to any political office, or in
connection with any primary election or political
convention or caucus held to select candidates for any
political office .••• "
Section 44lb(b) (2) provides that the term "contribution or
expenditure" shall include
"any direct or indirect payment, distribution, loan,
advance, deposit, or gift of money, or any services, or
anything of value ..• to any candidate, campaign
committee, or political party or organization, in
connection with any election ...• "
This section refers to election expenditures by corporations,
which the Act prohibits unless such expenditures are made from
segregated funds. §44lb(b) (2) (C).
The general "definitions" section of FECA contains a broader
definition of expenditure, which "includes"
"any purchase, payment, distribution, loan, advance,
deposit, or gift of money or anything of value, made by
any person for the purpose of influencing any election
11
for federal office
2 U.S.C. §431(9) (A) (1)
(emphasis added) •
v;:ppee Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc.

(MCFL)

is a

Massachusetts nonprofit, nonmembership corporation, organized
~

"[t]o foster respect for human life and to defend the right to
life of human beings, born and unborn, through education,
~~

political and other forms of activities."

App., at 3.

Shortly

before the September 1978 Massachusetts primary elections, MCFL
published and distributed a flyer entitled "Special Election
Edition."

The flyer

(a copy of which is included in the Juris.

Stmt.) was headed "EVERYTHING YOU NEED TO VOTE PRO-LIFE."
...______.....

The

publication contained the voting records on abortion-related

-

3 -

issues of many candidates for federal and state offices.

It

included at least two exhortations to "vote pro-life" and a
- ·-

-- -- ~~~---:>

statement that "No Pro-Life Candidate Can Win In November Without
Your Vote In September."

The publication contained photographs

only of those candidates who were considered "pro-life."

At the

back of the publication, next to the exhortation "Vote Pro-Life,"

Does Not Represent An Endorsement Of Any Particular Candidate."
Copies of the Special Election Edition (along with a subsequently
published correction sheet) were distributed to about 6,000 MCFL
contributors and some 50,000 noncontributing supporters.

MCFL

also sent copies to local chapters and to individuals who
requested them.

The FEC contends that the rest of the 100,000

copies printed were left in public areas for general
distribution.

MCFL spent a total of $9,812.76 from its general

treasury in preparing, printing and distributing the
publications.
In response to a complaint, the FEC investigated and found
probable cause to believe that MCFL

____.......__
violated 2 u.s.c.

§44lb(a) by

printing the flyers and distributing them to the general public.
When conciliation proved unsuccessful, the FEC filed a complaint
pursuant to 2 U.S.C. §437(g) (a) (6) (A), seeking a civil penalty
and such other relief as the court deemed appropriate.
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment in the
DC (D. Mass., Garrity), and the court granted summary judgment
for appee, holding that the two publications did not fit within
the term "expenditure" in §44lb(b) (2).

It also held that the

- 4 publications were exempted from the prohibition against
expenditures by §431(9) (B) (i), which exempts
"any news story, commentary, or editorial distributed
through the facilities of any ••• newspaper, magazine,
or other periodical publication, unless such facilities
are owned or controlled by any political party,
political committee, or candidate."
Finally, the court concluded that if §44lb were applied to
prohibit appee's expenditures in connection with the publications
in question, the statute would be unconstitutional, violating the
organization's right to freedom of speech, press, and
association.
/

cAl affirmed.

The court first rejected appee's (and the

DC's) arguments that its expenditures were not covered by §44lb,
and specifically found that those expenditures violated §44lb as
alleged by the FEC.

The court held that the Special Election

Edition expressly advocated the election or defeat of clearly
identified candidates, and that it did not fall within the
statutory exemption for

ne~sletters

or periodicals codified in

§431(9) (b) (i).
Although it found that appee had violated §44lb, the court

wen~ ied

to expenditures by nonprofit (

"ideological" corporations like MCFL, §441

was unconstitutional.

may be justified only by a showing of substantial government

\
interest.

Although the statute permits appee to use its

corporate funds to establish a voluntary, segregated fund to be
used for political purposes, §44lb(b) (2) (C), the availability of
' does not justify
alternative methods of funding speech

-
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"eliminating the simplest method."

App., at 20.

Nor is the

regulation necessary to protect a substantial government

\..__..----·--·

interest.

·--------------------~-~~----....___,

The interests at stake in FEC v. National Right to

Work Committee (NRWC), 459 U.S. 197, 207-208 (1982), are simply
not present here.

Because MCFL did not contribute directly to a

political campaign, its expenditures did not incur any political
debts from legislators.

See FEC v. National Conservative

Political Action Committee, 53 U.S.L.W. 4293, 4297 (1985)

("NRWC

is consistent with this Court's earlier holding that a
corporation's expenditures to propagate its views on issues of
general public interest are of a different constitutional stature
than corporate contributions to candidates.")

Moreover,

contributors to MCFL need not be protected from having their
money used for expenditures such as the special election edition;
individuals who contribute to MCFL do so because they support its
anti-abortion position and presumably would favor expenditures
for a publication that informs subscribers and others of the
position of various candidates on the abortion issue.
3.

CONTENTIONS:

APPNT - Appnt FEC attacks the judgment
~

below on two grounds.

(1) Section 44lb does not restrict
.'
political speech, but merely prohibits the use of corporate and
union treasury funds to reach the general public in support of,
or opposition to, federal candidates.

To make this limited

purpose clear, Congress enacted in 1971 an explicit exception
from the statute's prohibitory language, now codified as 2

u.s.c.

§44lb(b) (2) (C), which allows corporations and unions to operate a
voluntary, separate segregated fund for political purposes.

A

-

6 -

"separate segregated fund may be completely controlled by the
sponsoring corporation or union, whose officers may decide which
political candidates contributions to the fund will be spent to
assist."

NRWC, supra, 459 U.S., at 200 n.

4.

Section 44lb would

not prohibit MCFL from distributing the same election flyers to
the same people in the same manner it did here, so long as it
financed the distribution through a separate account containing
contributions voluntarily designated for political purposes. 1
Rather than disputing the Commission showing that §44lb has
not had the effect of limiting corporate or union political
speech, CAl found the statute unconstitutional because it
eliminated what the court considered "the simplest method" of
financing corporate speech.

App., at 20.

But this Court has

upheld virtually all of the Act's requirements with respect to
federal campaign financing without ever finding it necessary to
determine whether there was a "simpler method" available.

See,

e.g., NRWC, supra (limitation on use of corporate funds to
solicit contributions to finance political
v. Valeo, 424

u.s.

1, 23-38 (1976)

to publicly financed

candidates)~

activities)~

Buckley

(prohibition of contributions
id., at 60-82 (upholding

reporting and recordkeeping requirements for political committees
and

individuals)~

182, 197 (1981)

~ppnt

California Medical Association v. FEC, 453 U.S.

(limitation upon contributions to political

notes that MCFL did establish such a separate segregated
fund in 1980, and that it has reported to the FEC of having made
expenditures from that fund in every federal election since.

-

committees).

7 -

It is "well settled that '[t]he [First] Amendment

does not forbid ... regulation which ends in no restraint upon
expression or in any other evil outlawed by its terms and
purposes.'"

Lowe v. SEC, 105 S.Ct. 2557, 2581 n. 8 (1985)

(WHITE, J., concurring).
Finally, CAl's assertion that the First Amendment requires a

------------

general exemption from §44lb for corporations like MCFL because
-......__-~---

---..______......,

of the Act's requirement of disclosure of certain contributors to
all political committees, including separate segregated funds,
was effectively rejected by this Court in Buckley v. Valeo,
supra, 424

u.s.,

at 68 (upholding the reporting requirement

against First Amendment attack as "the least restrictive means of
curbing the evils of campaign ignorance and corruption that
Congress found to exist").
(2) Even if §44lb indirectly burdens corporate and union
political speech to some extent by making fund raising less
"simple," the statute plainly serves compelling governmental
purposes.

First, it is intended to ensure that the wealth that

corporations and unions accumulate with the aid of special legal
protections intended to serve other purposes cannot be diverted
to the electoral process to incur political debts from candidates
for federal elective office.

See NRWC, supra, 459

u.s.,

at 207.

The CAl found this purpose to be inapplicable here because
"MCFL's expenditures did not incur any political debts from
legislators."

App., at 22.

But the same could be said about the

independent expenditures for solicitations made by the National
Right to Work Committee; in fact, the CA in that case had

- 8 concluded that such independent solicitation, without more, would
neither corrupt officials nor distort elections.

In reversing

that decision, this Court emphasized that the constitutionality
of §44lb should not be judged by evaluating the effects on the
electoral process of the particular expenditure at issue.
Rather, §441 is a valid "prophylactic measure" aimed at "the
special characteristics of the corporate structure."
210.

NRWC, at

MCFL's corporate structure carries the potential for

influence that is the proper object of congressional regulation;
whether or not debts were actually incurred in this case - does not
alter the constitutional analysis.
Second, §44lb is designed "to protect the individuals who
have paid money into a corporation or union for purposes other
than the support of candidates from having that money used to
support political candidates to whom they may be opposed."
supra, at 208.

NRWC,

There is no reason to assume, as CAl did, that

anyone who supported MCFL's anti-abortion position would
necessarily be willing to contribute to its efforts to elect
candidates.

Individuals who oppose abortion do not necessarily

use this as the sole criterion for choosing candidates.

It is up

to Congress, not the Court of Appeals, to determine the
desirability of ensuring an opportunity for corporate
contributors to make an informed choice in this important area.
Moreover, §44lb serves the congressional purpose of "total
disclosure," see Buckley v. Valeo, 424

u.s.,

at 76, by requiring

that corporations and unions make their political contributions
and expenditures only from a separate segregated fund that, as a

- 9 policital committee, is required to report both its expenditures
and its sources of funding for disclosure on the public record.
2 U.S.C. §434.

If CAl's decision is permitted to stand, the

voting public will be denied the identities of the individuals
(and corporations) who finance the political expenditures of
corporations like MCFL, information that Congress has reasonably
determined to be important to maintenance of an informed
electorate.
APPEE - MCFL argues that if indeed its expenditures are
prohibited by §44lb,2 that section is unconstitutional as applied
in this case.

MCFL essentially tracks the reasoning of CAl.

(1) Section 44lb impermissibly regulates based on the

2MCFL indicates that if the Court determines that this case
is not appropriate for summary affirmance and sets it down for
oral argument, it intends to raise and brief the following
additional statutory and constitutional issues:
(1) Whether §44lb prohibits the independent expenditures made
by MCFL, since §44lb(b) (2) defines those expenditures that are
prohibited and that section only includes expenditures made
directly or indirectly to a candidate or campaign committee?
(2) Whether §44lb prohibits MCFL's expenditures, which
included no "express advocacy."
(3) Whether MCFL's newsletter is exempt from §44lb's
prohibition because it is a newsletter or periodical publication
within the meaning of FECA?
(4) Whether §44lb violates the Equal Protection Clause by
impermissibly regulating the subject of expression and the
identity of the speaker?
(5) Whether the phrases "in connection with," "for the purpose
of influencing," and "newspaper" contained in §44lb are
unconstitutionally vague?

-

10 -

political content of the speech in question.

It also violates

the guarantees of freedom of the press and freedom of
association.

Expenditure limits particularly impinge on

associational rights because any limitation on independent
expenditure "precludes most associations from effectively
amplifying the votes of their adherents, the original basis for
the recognition of the First Amendment protection of freedom of
association."

Buckley v. Valeo, 424

u.s.,

at 22.

Since limits

on expenditures have been found to violate an organization's
associational rights, e.g., FEC v. NCPAC, 55 U.S.L.W., at 4297,
clearly the total prohibition of expenditure by MCFL, simply
because it has chosen to associate in a corporate form, undercuts
its and its member's right of association.

That MCFL now

publishes its newsletter through a separate segregated fund is of
no moment (and indeed should not be considered, see Fed. Rule
Evid. 407).

The segregated fund was created only after the in

terrorem effect of enforcement proceedings by the FEC and was
possible only after MCFL's articles of organization and bylaws
had been amended to create membership categories.

In addition,

FECA's requirement that PAC's disclose the names of contributors,
2

u.s.c.

§434(b) (2), may be sufficient to deter political

activities.
(2) Nor does §44lb serve a sufficiently compelling
governmental interest to justify the substantial restriction on
the First Amendment rights of MCFL.

Truly independent

expenditures have scant potential for corrupting elected
representatives.

And even assuming there is a potential for a

- 11 corrupting influence from large independent expenditures by
business corporations, that danger simply does not exist in the
context of minimal expenditures (in this case less than $10,000)
by grass roots, nonpartisan, nonprofit, ideological organizations
such as MCFL.

FEC's second concern--that MCFL's publication of

the special election edition may go against the desires of some
its contributors--is misplaced.

That publication merely provides

an information service, leaving MCFL members free to decide to
vote for candidates based upon whatever criteria they choose.
4.

DISCUSSION:

CAl explicitly found that §44lb, as applied

to MCFL's expenditures in this case, violated the First
Amendment.

-

Accordingly, this is a proper appeal under 28 U.S.C.

~

§1252.

On the merits, this case presents a substantial federal

.....____

question.

While CAl was not clearly wrong, appt rightly
--··----~

identifies NRWC as providing substantial support for its
. ..

corporation's separate segregated fund. §44lb(b) (4) (C).
~-----..-.........

The

contested section allows a non-stock corporation to solicit
only of its "members."

Resps in NRWC claimed that the term

"members" had to be defined very broadly in order to avoid
infringing the corporation's First Amendment rights.

This Court

\rejected both the resps' broad reading of the term and its
(constitutional challenge to a narrower interpretation.
\

doing, the Court described and approyed of §44lb.

-----

-___,

'-

f3 r
funds~~~~

In so

It concluded

~

- 12 -

that the twin purposes advanced above by the FEe--preventing
wealth accumulated through special advantages accorded
corporations from being converted into political "war chests,"
and protecting individual contributors from misuse of their
contributions, were sufficiently compelling to justify the First
Amendment intrusion by the regulations.
~

Becaus~ dealt only with the term "member" as used to
define who may lawfully be solicited for contributions to a
corporation's segregated fund, it is not necessarily controlling
here (and hence summary reversal would probably be
inappropriate).

The discussion of the "member" issue, however,

seems to rest on the premise that the limitations on corporate
speech contained in §44lb are constitutionally permissible.

It

would be odd, in other words, for the Court to uphold
,,'

restrictions on who may be

soli~ited for contributions to a

corporation's segregated fund, and then to strike down as too
~s

restrictive the statutory scheme

a whole

(of which the

solicitation restrictions are a nonseverable part).
Because this case plainly raises a substantial federal
~--------------

question that seems too complicated to warrant summary treatment
in either direction, I recommend noting probable jurisdiction.
~

There is a motion to affirm.
December 13, 1985

Moulton

opn in petn
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No. 85-701, Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts
Citizens for Life, Inc. (CA 1)
Memorandum for File
The question presented is whether § 44lb of the Federal
Election Campaign Act is unconstitutional when applied to
expenditures by nonprofit "ideological" corporations like
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., the appellee in this
case.
Section 44lb, entitled "Contributions or expenditures by
national banks, corporations, or labor organizations", is
printed in full at p. 75(a) et seq. of the Jurisdictional Statement.

This section, like the entire Federal Election Campaign

Act, is long, complex, and must have been written by a chess
player.

For present purposes, the first paragragh on page 3

----

-

of appellant's brief summarizes the relevant provisions of

-

§ 44lb.

~

Perhaps the most important of these is that it

prohibits "any
corporation
whatever" or any labor organization
_______..---...----

-----

,,

from utilizing 'treasury funds to finance contributions or
~~

--------

expenditures in connection with a Federal election.
- ____,
The appellee is a pro-life entity incorporated under
Massachusetts law as a non-stock, non-membership corporation.
It has distributed by mail a newsletter to some 6,000 people
who have contributed or paid dues.

These newsletters have

contained articles of interest to pro-life people, but apparently

No. 85-701

2.

has not supported or ~-opposed political candidates.

In Septem-

,;/

ber 1978, prior to the September primaries for the election of
Massachusetts' candidates for Federal office, appellee published an eight page "Special Election Edition" of its
newsletter, and mailed it to 58,000 people.

The cost of

printing and distributing this edition was $9,812., paid for
by the corporation from its general treasury funds.
page headline read:

The front

"Everything you need to know to vote

pro-life"; the newsletter listed the names of candidates, and
reported their positions on pro-life issues.

It did state,

however, that no "particular candidate" was endorsed.

The

appellant (the Commission) does not dispute this.
After an investigation by the Commission, it filed a
complaint in the DC for Massachusetts alleging a violation of
§

44lb, and seeking a civil penalty as provided by the Act.
v'

Jr

Appellee admitted that it had expended corporate funds to

-----

----

- ------------

,.

-

publish the Special Election Edition, but claimed that was not
.._,______

-----------

-~

an unlawful "expenditure" under the Act, and that in any event
§

44lb as applied to it was unconstitutional.

On cross

motions for summary judgment, the DC held that the expenditure
by appellee did not violate § 44lb,

~t~~ation
"

of

the Act to appellee's expenditures "would violate its rights
to freedom of speech, press and association ... ".
Appendix p. 38(a).

Joint

No. 85-701

3.

The CA disagreed with the DC as to the applicability

C:/1 1

of § 44lb, and found that these expenditures violated
that section as alleged by the Commission.

The CA reasoned

that the Special Election Edition expressly advocated the
election of clearly identified candidates within the meaning
of our decision in Buckley v. Valeo.

Moreover, CA 1 held

that this publication did not come within the exemption for

IJk-r C'/1 I ~~be_
~fj'¥1./1 ~ ~
As noted above, the only question before us is the
~~

certain activities of the media.

constitutionality of § 44lb as applied in this case.

The

brief on behalf of the Commission argues that CA 1 erred in
holding that § 44lb, as applied to expenditures by nonprofit corporations, violates the First Amendment .

It is

emphasized that this section does not restrict the amount,
content or method of corporate and union political speech.
The Act does permit a corporation to use its treasury funds
to establish a separate segregated fund to be used for political
purposes, and such a fund can be controlled by the corporation
or union so long as its money is kept separately.

Appellant

further argues that substantial governmental interests are
involved, and that § 44lb (as applied) is consistent with the
intent of Congress to insure that the electorate is fully
informed not only about candidates and issues but also about

No . 85-701
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sources of campaign financing.

Buckley v. Valeo, of course,

is relied upon by appellant as well as appellee.
In a brief unduly encumbered by an appendix that apparently
includes the entire Federal Campaign Election Act, appellees
argue first that the DC correctly held that the publication
of this newsletter did not violate § 44lb.

It notes that

the definition of "expenditure" in§ 44lb(b)(2), applicable
to corporation, proscribes only a "direct or indirect payment
to any candidate."

The newsletter, according to appellee,

did not make any payment to a candidate, and indeed did not
advocate "the election or defeat of clearly identified candidates".

Rather, it published the voting records of candidates,

but did not urge that particular candidates be elected or
defeated .

[I note here, however, that the purpose of the

newsletter clearly was to elect pro-life candidates.

I am not

persuaded by this line of argument, but do think appellee
plausibly contends that the newsletter is a "newspaper" or
"periodical publication", within the meaning of the Act, and
therefore is exempt from the corporate prohibition.]

Although

the newsletter is not a "newspaper" in the normal sense of the
term, this special edition of appellees' regular newsletter
possibly can be viewed as a "periodical publication".

No. 85-701

5.

As to the constitutional issue, appellee of course argues
the CA 1 correctly held that § 44lb is unconstitutional as
applied to this publication.

As would be expected, appellee

relies on Buckley v. Valeo, and subsequent decisions under the
Act.

See brief, p. 23 et seq.
I will not prolong this memo dictated only to refresh my

recollection as to the issues.

I need to devote a good deal

more time to the case before coming to rest.

The brief on

behalf of the Commission is better written, and - on its face more persuasive than the rather unattractive brief for appellee.
One quite telling argument by the Commission is that § 44lb does
not in fact restrict corporate political speech.

It only

prohibits "the use of corporate and union treasury funds to
reach the general public in support of, or opposition to,
Federal candidates ... " (Emphasis added).

Thus, if appellee

had created a separate segregated fund, derived from contributions of subsribers or sympathizers, that fund could be used
without limit to publish the corporation's views in support
of, or in opposition to, any candidate.

Thus, the burdening

of First Amendment rights is - at most - quite limited, and
as appellees' brief argues the Government interests are substantial.

No. 85-701

6.

I would welcome my Clerk's views.

There are a number

of decisions construing and applying this Act that I have had
no opportunity to reread.

I was one of the three Justices

(with Stewart and Brennan) who wrote Euckley, but I do not
have the more recent cases in mind.

L.F.P.

~PM-~~

(/

.5~ ~~ ~~~ ~-(.L?

~~~ ~--£-~ u-? ''u~A..~''~

$4'-1 t .lr- g

5~~~./P~r'l-23 .
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BENCH MEMORANDUM

To:
From:

Mr. Justice Powell

August 19, 1986

Leslie
No. 85-701

Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life,
Inc.
Cert. to CAl (Breyer, Rosenn, Torruella, C.J.s)
Tuesday, Oct. 7, 1986 (last argument)
I

This

is

another

in

a

line of

cases

presented

to

this

Court challenging certain provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455.

The question pre-

-

sented is whether §44lb, which prohibits corporations from making

--------

expenditures in connection with federal elections, is unconstitu-

page 2.

tional as applied to a nonprofit ideological nonmembership corporation.
II
This is an appeal from an enforcement action brought by
the Federal Election Commission

(FEC)

Citizens for Life,

MCFL is a nonprofit, nonmember-

Inc.

(MCFL).

against the Massachusetts

ship corporation, organized "[t]o foster

respect for human life

and to defend the right to life of all human beings, born or unborn,
ties."

through

education,

political

and

other

forms

of

activi-

/

For several years, MCFL published a newsletter at irregu-

lar intervals, between five and eight times a year.

The list of

receivers included all individuals who contributed to the organization,
any

either through the payment of $15 per year in "dues" or

lesser

amount,

and

when

funds

were

available,

expanded

to

include individuals who merely indicated interest in the organization.

The circulation

and 3,119, respectively.

in May and October of 1978 were 2,109
The MCFL newsletter typically contained

information about MCFL's pro-life activities,

and political de-

velopments in the area.
MCFL
prior

to

copies of
You

Need

sometimes

elections.
its

published
In

a

September

"Special
1978,

it

Elections Edition"
published

100,000

"Special Elections Edition" headlined "Everything

.
'dh
.
To Vote ~
Pro-Life."
The ed1.t1on
conta1ne
t e v'
vot1ng

records on abortion issues of many federal and state candidates,
favorable pro-life votes marked with a "y" and unfavorable votes
marked with an "n".

The candidates were also rated with stars

according to the totality of their records, with photographs of
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some of the most stellar candidates included.

/

the edition stated "VOTE PRO-LIFE."

In several places,

On the back of the edition,

beside one of these exhortations, was printed the caveat,

1

"This

special election edition does not represent an endorsement of any
particular candidate."
·-- ~

~··---·-·

---------~---------------------

MCFL spent a total of $9,812.76 from its

general treasury on the Special Edition and 20,000 copies on a
~

partial Special Edition published to correct errors in the first
edition.
5,985

Copies of the two Special Editions were distributed to

MCFL

contributors

and

50,674

Other

non-contributors.

copies were sent to MCFL local chapters for distribution and the
parties

are

in

dispute over

whether

to additional copies were

left in public areas for general distribution.

/
The FEC determined that, by printing the special election
editions, MCFL violated 2

u.s.c ~---f44i-bcaD

which makes it unlaw-

'----·----

ful "for any corporation whatever ... to make a contribution or
expenditure in connection with any election at which a Senator or
Representative

in

...

Congress are

to

be voted

for."

The FEC

filed a civil complaint pursuant to 2 U.S.C. §437g(a) (6) (A) seeking a civil penalty and other appropriate relief.

CJ ~ _:
(JM?r

,. }1:J

that the Special Editions did not meet the definition of "expenditure" applicable to § 44lb, because they were not "to any can~

_.,_~~

by §44lb because they qualified under an exception for

Cv"' story,

~--~~~·
~t1es

t-.1

The DC also found that the editions were not pr,2._!? _i t~ ;>

?~

~

~

didate."

ty~l
~

The DC found

commentary,

or editorial distributed through the facili-

'
'
'
'
o f any ... per1od1cal
publ1cat1on.

Finally,

;-~

I1

'
2 u.s.c. §431(9) (B) (1).

the DC held that if §44lb were intended by Congress to

·
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apply to the Special Editions it would be unconstitutional under
the First Amendment because it would violate MCFL's freedoms of

Th~ ~DC

speech, press and association.

relied on three factors in

inding the statute unconstitutional as applied:

first, that the

danger of corruption did not exist because the expenditures were
independent of any candidate or party; second, that MCFL's status

-

~

as a nonprofit ideological corporation distinguished it from the
profit-making corporations which Congress could legitimately seek
to regulate;

and

t~~rd,

that the purpose of the publication was

direct political speech, not solicitation of contributions.
The CAl affirmed on the constitutional grounds only.

The

CAl adopted a broader definition of "expenditure" in §44lb, and
found that the Special Editions qualified.

The CAl further found

that the editions did not meet the "press" exception to the expenditure regulation.
£lie<L_ to I(. indirect,

Finally,

the CAl found that §44lb as ap-

-=--

uncoordinated expenditures by a

non-profit

-

ideological corporation expressing its views of political candidates violates the organization's First Amendment rights."
CAl noted that nonprofit corporations could engage

The

in the same

political speech by forming a separately-funded political action
committee

(PAC), but held that the availability of other methods

of funding speech did not justify eliminating the simplest method.

The CAl based this decision on a finding that expenditures

by nonprofit

corporations~oes

that §44lb was meant

not pose the problem of corruption

to ' address.

Consequently,

the government

did not offer a substantial justification for the limitation on
speech imposed.

The FEC now appeals from the CAl's decision.
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III
Several cases form the background for the issue presented
in this case.
upheld

In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1975), the Court

limitations

~&<-~

s~n

upheld

contributions

imposed

by

similar limitations on expenditures.

"FECA

the

on

provision

which

requires

all

the

FECA,

but

The Court also
individuals

and

groups to report expenditures, so long as "expenditure" is limited to a communication that expressly advocates

the election or

defeat of a clearly identified candidate.
In First National Bank of Boston v.
765

(1978)

(Powell,

constitutionally
concern,

as

J.),

435 U.S.

the Court held that a state could not

regulate corporate

opposed •to

Bellotti,

speech

on

speech on

issues of public

candidate

elections,

since

speech on issues does not pose a danger of corruption.
The

Court

in Citizens Against Rent Control v.

Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290

(1981)

City of

held that a city may not constitu-

tionally limit the contributions to committees formed to support
or oppose ballot measures,
tion was only present

because again,

the danger of corrup-

in candidate elections.

The Court found

that freedom of association is diluted if it does not include the
right to pool money through contributions since funds are often
necessary if advocacy is to be effective.
In Federal Election Commission v. National Right to Work
Committee

(NRWC),

459 U.S. 197

(1982), the Court upheld one sub-

section of §44lb which provides that a corporation without capital stock may solicit contributions to a separate segregated fund
for political activity only from "members,"

even as it was ap-
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plied

to

context,

a

nonprofit

nonmember

advocacy

corporation.

In

this

the Court respected the "legislative judgment that the

special character is tics of the corporate structure require particularly careful
of wealth

regulation,"

amassed

by

the

because

substantial aggregations

special advantages which go with the

corporate form of organization could be converted into political
"war chests" which could be used to incur political debts from
legislators who are aided by the contributions.
The Court in Federal Election Commission v. National Conservative Political Action Committee
(1985)

(NCPAC),

105

S.

Ct.

1459

invalidated a limit on independent expenditures by politi-

cal committees.

The Court found the First Amendment freedom of

association squarely implicated,
by which large numbers of
together

in

organizations

their adherents."

finding PACs to be "mechanisms

individuals of modest means can join
which

serve

to amplify the

voice of

The Court stated that "preventing corruption

or the appearance of corruption are the only legitimate and compelling government interests thus far

identified for restricting

campaign finances," and the danger of corruption did not support
wholesale regulation of the expenditures by PACs.

Even if Con-

gress could have seen some danger of corruption from expenditures

~

~r

by large PACs, the regulation was fatally overbroad.
.,/

Several principles emerge from these cases.
only

basis

for

regulating

campaign

financing

is

First,

the

the danger of

actual or apparent corruption of candidates . .,/ Second, contributions to candidates or
danger of corruption,

their committees are likely to pose the

whereas independent

enditures are not.

~~--~--~~~---
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Third,

corporate speech as to candidates may be limited because

it may pose the danger of corruption, but corporate speech as to

-

issu~s

lated.

-

"--

does not pose a corruption danger and so may not be regu~ Fourth,

Congress may determine that certain dangers are

inherent in the corporate form and may adopt prophylactic measures regarding contributions addressed to all corporations, large
and small, profit and nonprofit. v/ Fifth,

a prophylactic measure

which impinges on associational and speech rights without a justification in preventing corruption is overbroad.

v
statutory

The
principles
group,

to a

scheme

large extent.

as

it

now

exists

A "person"

reflects

is any individual or

including a political committee or corporation.

§431(11).

these

2

u.s.c.

All persons are subject to contribution limitations.

2 U.S.C. §44la.

Persons are subject to no limitation on expendi-

tures, except that they must disclose "independent expenditures"
in excess of $250 per year, defined as communications which expressly advocate the election or defeat of a particular identified candidate.

2

u.s.c.

§434(b).

Corporations are subject to
2

u.s.c.

They may, however, form a separate segregated fund

(PAC).

an absolute
§44lb.

2

u.s.c.

bar on

§44lb(b).

"contributions and expenditures".

The PAC can solicit contributions from the

executive personnel and stockholders of a profitseeking corporation, and from the members of a nonprofit corporation.
§44lb(b).

2

u.s.c.

A political committee is a PAC or any group under the

control of a candidate or the major purpose of which is the nomination or election of a candidate, Buckley, 424

u.s.

at 79, which

receives contributions or makes expenditures in excess of $1000

per year.

2

u.s.c.

§431(4).

by political committees,

There is no limit on expenditures

except that they are subject to exten-

sive reporting requirements.

2

u.s.c.

§434.

A. Interpretation of "Expenditure"
The first question presented in this case is one of statutory interpretation.

The DC found that the MCFL Special Editions

did not fit within the definition of "expenditure" in §44lb.
CAl found that they did.

This Court is faced with a choice.

The
It

can construe the statute narrowly, as did the DC, and avoid addressing the constitutional question directly, or it can adopt a
broad

interpretation of

the

statute

and

determine

broad definition is constitutional as applied.

whether

the

Neither the nar-

row nor the broad definition is completely supported by the statutory language and legislative history.
1.

-~

The CAl

t.fd J' ~Editions to
·'r~~
~ r ff'l"" hibits "any

2

··~

expenditure
.

~)1-~~(~)

(2)

,~ ~erm

~~~~

~

be

Narrow Definition of "Expenditure"
found

the funds

spent in publishing the Special

an "expenditure" under §44lb.

Section 44lb pro-

corporation whatever" from making "a contribution or
in

provides

connection
that

"contribution or

with

"[f) or

any

purposes of

expenditure"

this

Subsection

"

election

section

•.. ,

the

shall include any direct or

Ll1 ndirect payment, ... , or anything of value ... to any candidate,
campaign committee, or political party or organization,
nection with any election ..•• "
of

the

include

FECA contains a

bro~~er

"

...

person for

any purchase,

the purpose of

in con-

The general definitions section
def..ipi tion of

"expenditure"

or anything of value,

to

made by any

influencing any election for Federal
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office."

This section further states that "expenditure" does not

include "any payment made or obligation incurred by a corporation
or

a

labor

organization,

which

under

section

44lb(b)

of

this

title, would not constitute an expenditure by such corporation or
labor organization."

These sections read together appear to lim-

it the prohibition of corporate expenditures to the definition
expenditures

in §44lb.

of ~

There appears to be no other reason to

have a separate definition of expenditure in §44lb and explicitly
to

limit the general definition to the separate definition as

applied to corporations and labor unions.
Despite the words of the statute,
...._

""

....__

an examination of the

legislative history indicates that it is unlikely that Congress
intended

to

--

limit

the definition of

"expenditure"

what is in effect an indirect contribution.

--·- -~-----~~-

found

indirect

"contribution."
penditure"
ous.

If

_________...___

contributions
424

u.s.

--

to

at 78.

fit

--

in §44lb to

The Court in Buckley

within

the

definition

of

The retention of the word "ex-

in the statute after Buckley would thus be superfluthe

retention of the words

"to any candidate"

in the

definition of "expenditure" in §44lb nevertheless requires explanation, these words could be read to distinguish corporate spending on issues, protected under Bellotti, from corporate spending
on candidate elections.

Read in this way, the words do not nee-

essarily limit expenditures "in connection with" candidate elections.
Neither the narrow nor the
ture"

------....

-

!:>~

of

"e-~endi

in §44lb is completely supported by the language or con-

gressional

intent.

The

narrow definition,

however,

appears

to
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stretch congressional intent further and run the risk of judicial
legislating.
would

be

Moreover,

to

exempt

the

most

result

of

expenditures

labor unions from coverage under §44lb.
terpretation would

save

a

narrow

by

all

interpretation

corporations

and

Although the narrow in-

the constitutionality of §44lb,

it may

not be appropriate when the result is to alter greatly the apparent statutory coverage.
2.

Broad Definition of "Expenditure"

The other
that

way

"expenditure"

to

interpret §44lb is as the CAl did --

incorporates

the

broad

definition

-

of

§431.

The Buckley Court found the broad definition "for the purpose of
influencing"
criminal

an unconstitutionally vague basis for

sanctions

and

limited

the

definition

to

imposing

expenditures

which expressly advocate the election or defeat of a particular
candidate.

The CAl did not decide whether the "express advocacy"

limitation of Buckley applies to the corporate definition of "expenditure" because it decided that the MCFL Special Editions met
this definition.
There is statutory support for the position that Congress
did not intend to apply the "express advocacy"
limitation to the
.,
definition

of

"expenditure"

in

§44lb.

Congress

specifically

amended the FECA to include a definition of "independent expenditure".

If Congress had intended it to apply to corporate expen-

ditures, it could have changed the language in §44lb from "expenditure" to "independent expenditure".
not

read

Buckley

to
it

include

would

be

the

"express

Nevertheless,
advocacy"

unconstitutionally

vague

if §44lb is

limitation,
because

under

criminal
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sanctions may be imposed for a violation.

Moreover, the "express

advocacy" limitation imposed in Buckley was specifically aimed at
disclosure requirements.

Because the formation of a PAC requires

disclosing all contributors,

the disclosure safeguard of Buckely

should apply.
One alternative would be for the Court to find that Congress did not intend the "express advocacy" limit to apply to the
definition of "expenditure"
unconstitutionally vague.

in §44lb and to invalidate §44lb as
This decision, however, would be very

narrow and of short duration since Congress could amend §44lb to
contain the limit and the same challenge now presented would re~~

cur in a few years.

~~t

The better alternative appears to be for the

to adopt the position it did in Buckley and "construe the

; • {/0"

~

,• statute,

if that can be done consistent with the legislature's

j?-]--p.Jw-'- purpose, to avoid the shoals of vagueness."
If
adopted

this

interpretation

of

424 U.S. at 78.

"expenditure"

in

§44lb

is

that "expenditure" actually means "independent expen-

diture" as defined in the FECA -- then it is necessary to determine whether the MCFL Special Editions meet the definition.

exact 1 befinitio~

as stated

in ~uckley

The

is:

expenditures for communications that in express terms
advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified
candidate for federal office.
This construction
would restrict the application
to communications
containing express words of advocacy of election or
defeat, such as "vote for," "elect," "support," "cast
your ballot for," "Smith for Congress," "vote against,"
"defeat," "reject." 424 u.s. at 44 & n. 52.
In finding the Special Editions to meet the definition, the CAl
relied on the facts

that the editions several times said "VOTE

j
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PRO-LIFE",

/

contained pictures of

the candidates,

and were dis-

tributed to a wide audience of nonmembers.
Whether the Special Editions meet the definition of "express advocacy"
revised

its

is a very close question.

regulations

to

state

that

The FEC has recently l
distribution

of

voting

records alone does not constitute an "independent expenditure."
11 C.F.R.

The

§114.4 (b) (4), (5).

only way

that

these

editions

went beyond voting records was that they connected voting record
with issues, and advocated votes based on the candidates' records
on the issues.

The Buckley Court emphasized that "[f]unds spent

to propogate one's views on issues without expressly calling for
a candidate's election or defeat are •.. not covered."
at 44.

-

434 U.S.

In one sense, the editions merely advocated a position on

a particular

issue.

The editions further stated,

however, that

~

the

issue

should

implication of

form

this

is

the

basis

that

for

the

choosing candidates.

editions

supported

candidates according to their positions on the issue.

The

particular
There is a }

very fine line between saying "Vote for Jones" and saying "Vote

I

Pro-Life" next to a picture of Jones with a stellar pro-life voting record.
a.

Narrow Definition of "Express Advocacy"

The most

straightforward

application of Buckley to

the \

facts of this case results in a finding that the Special Editions

are ~tutsid; the narrow definition of "express
~

advo~".

B ,

the Buckley Court found an unlimited definition of "expenditure"
unconstitutionally vague because it had "the potential for encompassing

both

issue

discussion and

advocacy of

a

political re-

~
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sult."
as

424

u.s.

at 79.

Here, the Special Editions can be viewed

.
'1 y '~Issue-oriente
.
d"",
primari

with

the

candidates

incidentally

~

benefiting

'-----.,

from

the

expenditure

~

pro-life issues.

because

of

their

positions on

because the Special Editions contained

the voting records of hundreds of candidates, the connection between the advocacy and a "particular candidate" was attenuated.
Third,

the disclaimer on the back of the first Special Edition,

that it did "not represent an endorsement of any particular candidate," may be read to mitigate the effect of any advocacy.

Fi-

nally, the Buckley Court did not appear disturbed by the prospect
that many expenditures of benefit to a candidate's campaign would
not

constitute

"express

"So

advocacy":

groups eschew ["express advocacy"]

•

• •

long

as

persons

they are free to spend as

I

much as they want to promote the candidate and his views."

u.s.
tute

that the MCFL Special Editions do not consti-

"express advocacy"
lower

I

attempts

should be based on some principle that

courts will be
to distinguish

able

to apply.
advocacy

issue

will be very difficult to apply.
cial Editions

were

future

applications

groups

usually

do

instead base their
So,

424

at 45.
A finding

the

and

published
will
not

be

Any definition which
from candidate advocacy

Here, it is clear that the Spe-

by

an

more

issue-oriented
ambiguous.

support candidates

iss~

.,...--- ------

Individuals

and

the abstract,

but

the distinction be-

and candidate advocacy appears illusory.
----.

But

support on the candidate's views on issues.

in the context of candidate elections

tween

in

group.

---v-

....--.

-

For exam-

-· -

ple, on which side of the "express advocacy" definition would a
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flyer which said "Vote reduced military spending" next to a picture of Smith fall?
"express

advocacy"

The only apparent bright line would be that
requires

that

a

word

of

exhortation,

"vote", be verbally connected with the name of a candidate.

e.g.,
Any

less rigid standard would require lower courts to make fine distinctions in emphasis and wording.

This narrow definition would

exclude the MCFL Special Editions from coverage under §44lb and
resolve the case.
b.

Broad Definition of "Express Advocacy"

Reading Buckley as a whole, however, a broader definition
"express advocacy" may be justified.
of

the

"express

advocacy"

definition

The primary application
is

in

2 U.S.C.

§434(c),

which requires that all "persons" disclose all "independent expenditures" and the primary contributors thereto.

Thus, a narrow

definition of "express advocacy" would not only exclude any corporate

expenditures

similar

to

the MCFL Special Editions

from

regulation under §44lb, it would also exclude these types of expenditures from any type of disclosure.
nized Congress'

strong

The Buckley Court recog-

interest in achieving "total disclosure"

by reaching "every kind of political activity."
(quoting

S.

Rep.

No.

92-229,

p.

57

(1971)),

434

u.s.

at 76

primarily because

disclosure helps voters to define the candidates' constituencies.
Where a communication contains words of exhortation such as "Vote
for .... " and pictures of candidates, it appears to be an expenditure that Congress could legitimately require be disclosed for
the informational purpose of defining a candidate's constituency.
Here,

the fact

that certain candidates are supported by a pro-
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life

group

may

be

extraordinarily

sides of the pro-life debate.

relevant

to

voters on both

Disclosure in fact furthers public

information rather than stifling it.

For this reason, the defi-

nition of "expenditure" as it relates to disclosure regulations
may be viewed differently than as it relates to expenditure limitations.
Congress'

interest in disclosure exists whenever a par-

ticular constituency indicates its support for a particular candidate.

Thus,

the appropriate test would be that where a commu-

nication contains "advocacy"
ticular

candidates"

it

("vote for")

should

and one or more "par-

constitute

"express

advocacy".

This definition would allow lower courts to distinguish between
publications which contain nonpartisan voting records, which simply portray every candidate's vote without expressing a point of
view, and those which incorporate advocacy and therefore indicate
support by a particular constituency for a particular candidate.
Applying this definition to the MCFL Special Editions, they would
constitute "express advocacy" and thus qualify as "expenditures"
under §44lb.
B.

Press Exemption

If the MCFL Special Editions are found to fit within the

l

§44lb definition of
press advocacy",

"expenditure"

because

they constitute

"ex-

then it is necessary to determine whether they

are nonetheless exempt from censure because they fall within the
"press"
that:
story,

exemption

" [ t] he

term

commentary,

from

"expenditure."

'expenditure'

does

This
not

exemption provides

include

any news

or editorial distributed through the facili-
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ties of any broadcasting station, newspaper, magazine, or other
periodical publication,
found

that

the MCFL

II

2 U.S.C.

newsletters

were

§431(9) (B) (i).
not

The CAl

"periodical publica-

tions" and thus that the Special Editions were not "distributed
through the facilities of any ... periodical publication."

The

CAl assumed arguendo that the MCFL newsletter was a periodical
publication but found that the Special Editions did not qualify
for the exemption because their circulation was 20 times that of
any edition of the newsletter, they did not carry the MCFL newsletter masthead, nothing in them informed readers that they were
related

to

the

newsletter,

and

the Special Edi toins were pub-

lished by a different staff.
The press exemption was adopted in 1974.
port

indicates

press or

that

association,

it was
and

statute to preexisting law.

intended

that

it was

not

to

The House Re-

limit

intended

freedoms

of

to conform the

One important element of preexisting

law was a statement by this Court that:
[i]t would require explicit words in an act to convince
us that Congress intended to bar a trade journal, a
house organ or a newspaper, published by a corporation,
from expressing views on candidates or political proposals in the regular course of publication.
United
States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 123 (1948).
The MCFL newsletter appears like a trade journal.

~ ~ourt

However,

also noted that:

[i] t is one thing to say that trade or labor union
periodicals published regularly for members, stockholders or purchasers are allowable ... and quite another
to say that in connection with an election occasional
pamphlets or dodgers or free copies widely scattered
are forbidden.
Ibid.

the
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Here, the CAl relied upon the fact that the Special Editions were distributed widely

If such facts were found to fit the

recieving the periodical.
press exemption,

to individuals not accustomed to

then any publication by a corporation which re-

sembled a newsletter would be protected, no matter what its distribution and no matter how blatant and vehement

its advocacy.
it falls

When a communication falls within the
co~~~~~CA.

There is no disclosure requirement,

expenditure limitation, or contribution limitation.
exemption

is

so drastic,

related statements.

it

should

be

limited

Because this

to truly press-

The limitation implied in CIO that the press

exemption should apply only to communications published and distributed in the regular course of business and in the same manner
as

the trade

journal itself appears a

sensible and enforceable

line to draw.
C. Constitutionality of §44lb as Applied
If

-----------~--------~-------------

the MCFL Special Editions are

found

not

to fit

the

press exemption, then §44lb ostensibly forbids MCFL from publishing them unless it forms a PAC.

The FEe - argues that §44lb does
...
not limit speech at all, it simply imposes necessary safeguards.
MCFL,

~

however,

claims a

if corporations

number of burdens
~

like MCFL have . to

from

forming

form .. PACs,

a PAC. ·

then they

must change into membership organizations, since nonstock corporations can only solicit PAC contributions from "members."

NRWC.

This impinges on the corporation's chosen method of organization
and limits the

individuals from whom it can seek contributions

since many individuals will not want to become members.

~
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the

burdensome

administrative

and

record-keeping

requirements

severely impinge on the ability of a small corporation like MCFL
to use its limited funds for political communication.

Third, the

FECA requires PACs to disclose the names of contributors.
would

deter

the

small

contributors

upon

which

This

an organization

like MCFL relies.

- ~(

;:.

If

a

regulation

imposes

any

burden

on First Amendment
\\

--- -------

then the government must show a ~ ompelling justification

'ghts,

....._______

that is narrowly tailored to meet the perceived threat.
~

\

~~ 434

(/"""~

v'~

u.s.

at 25.

The principles developed in previous cases form

t : e framework for
pelling government

~~ ~ampaign

finances

this analysis.

i~sts

to expenditures.

~

cal advocacy machines,
expenditure limit.
limits

"on~ mate and com-

thus far iOentified for restricting

NCPAC, 105 S. Ct. at 1469.

The danger

has only thus far been tied to contributions, not

~~~-~

diture

The

[is the] preventing [of] corruption or the ap-

~ . pearance of corruption."

~~~rrupti~n

Buckley,

~-- ~~

of

In fact, even PACs, which are explicit politicannot constitutionally be subject to an

NCPAC.
§44lb

The only justification for the expen-

would

appear

to

be

that

Congress

has

rightly discerned a danger of corruption stemming from the "corporate form."
tions

when

The Court has upheld the "corporation" classifica-

contributions

were

at

issue.

NRWC.

~J...~~

It has -at rtiek

c~ra

.dewt! a classification "which indiscriminately lumps with

tions any 'committee, association or organization'" where e
ditures were at issue.

~~
~~~·

r~ :-----tllf~rent

NCPAC, 105 S. Ct. at 1471.

light of these principles,

'
pos1' t10n...§...:

en-

~.41

~/

the Court can take three

the Court coul d h o ld t h at

II

corpora-

page 19.

tions"

is a valid congressional classification for all campaign

regulation purposes because of their special attributes, and up-

~·

hold §44lb as applied in this case.
on

the Court could rely

the contribution/expenditure distinction and

gress

cannot

limit

corporate

expenditures

pose the danger of corruption.

Third,

find

because

that Con-

they do

not

the Court could rely on

the danger of corruption as the only legitimate basis for regulating campaign funding and find that expenditures by nonprofit
~

corporations do not pose this threat.

weakest ~

The first route seems the

This Court has con-

sistently looked at the facts of each individual case and weighed
-~---~-~

~·~""""'----

the impact of the regulation on the particular speech against the
governmental interest asserted.

The strongest argument in favor

of the FEC is that the regulation at issue does not completely
bar speech, it only channels it.

Nevertheless, in the context of

a small, low budget corporation, this argument is not compelling.

----=----...._______..

The very essence of this Court's decisions invalidating campaign

that ~is

financing regulations is
requirement

that

a

corporation

form

for ~

The

diverts money

from

necessary
a

PAC

speech to administrative costs and therefore burdens speech rather than merely channeling it.
interest,
greater

the

than

limitations

danger
in NCPAC,

on

PACs.

of

As to the government's compelling

corruption

here

where the Court
The

Court

found

does

not

appear

any

invalidated expenditure
the

statute

"fatally

overbroad" because it was "not limited to multimillion dollar war
chests;

its

terms

apply equally to informal discussion groups

that solicit neighborhood contributions to publicize their views

~

page 20.

II

105 S. Ct. at 1470.

Here,

It is

~FL ~~ t.

a grass roots organization that sells roses and holds car washes
to raise money.

The Court

in NCPAC reiterated the distinction

between contributions and expenditures, finding that the absence
of prearrangement and coordination of PAC spending undermined the
danger

of

true in this case.
:a ~

here

Exactly

corruption.

the

same

rationale

records.

hold

The expenditures
were completely
uncoordinat'---.------.....--.....__' -·
--~

- ~.

~

in fact much more so than most PAC spending.
were

should

supported

because

of

already

The candidates

established

voting

----

The publication was more a recognition of deeds already

-

'----"

--

-~---...

done than a call to begin bestowing favors on a constituency.
Another

justification

offered

for

the

broad

"corpora-

tions" category is that it is necessary to effectuate the expenditure limits on big, powerful corporations which do pose a danger

of

corruption.

This Court has

refused

to

uphold

campaign

financing regulations on the basis that they close loop-holes in
other valid rules.

Buckley, 434

a regulation infringes
regulation

[is]

u.s.

at 80-81.

Moreover, where

a First Amendment right, "[p]recision of

the

touchstone."

(quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.

415,

Buckley,
438

434

(1963)).

u.s.

at

41

There ap-

pears to be no reason why the FEC could not adopt more functional
categories which address a
one.

real corruption danger,

if there is

The FEC could, for example, limit the category to corpora-

tions over a certain net profit, if war chests are the real danger.
ful

The FEC also claims that big corporations and other powerindividuals could

funnel money through ideological corpora-

tions and thereby avoid contribution and disclosure requirements.

page 21.

That is not, however, possible.

Any group which makes independ-

ent expenditures over $250 per year must disclose all contributors of over $200, and identify any contributor of over $200 who
earmarked the funds for a political purpose.

2

u.s.c.

§434 (c).

These requirements imposed on all groups and individuals ensure
that all contributions over $200 and all expenditures over $250
will be disclosed.
I

The

second -ZQ.Ute,

•r

........=-==

,,

and expenditures,

-.-

distinguishing

between

'

\....

contributions

is well supported in this Court's recent cases

and is already reflected to a large extent in the FECA.
}.-

~

.,.., e a'sy principle ~pply,

b{~~wer

"yi;~-

.LC

and

if it were adopted,

court confusion substantially.

It is an

should reduce

One problem with this route

~.W ~ at it appears that four justices no longer agree with the
\__

,Pv ~~d'

~ ~

·

.

•

1St1nct1on.

See NCPAC,

105

s.

Ct.

at

1481

(The

justices are

BURGER, WHITE, BLACKMON and most recently, MARSHALL).

It is un-

clear what the result of a change in the Court will be.

The sec-

ond problem with this route is that the easy answer may not be
I(

the best one.

There is a strong argument that unlimited expendi-

- --·-

\\

tures by large corporations could indeed pose the danger of cor-

-----It is inconceivable to me

ruption.
_....

that if Xerox spends a lot of

money independently advancing an individual's candidacy, that the
fact

date knows of a large expenditure,
corruption is there.

it seems that the danger of

The Court has reiterated that multimillion

dollar war chests may pose a danger of corruption.
want
which

If a candi-

is not brought to the individual's attention.

to

leave open

rationally

the option to Congress

isolates

for

regulation

The Court may

to tailor a

those

war

statute

chests,

be

page 22.

they corporations or PACs, whose expenditures pose a real danger
of corruption.
The

third
- - - .route
..

appears

the

best

one.

In NCPAC,

the

~~~

-

Court invalidated as overbroad a statute which limited the expendi tures

of corporations,

committees,

tions.

The Court declined

associations

to adopt a

or

organiza-

limiting construction to

save the statute, primarily because it found no legislative indication that Congress would be content with the new construction.
The

same method

could

be

employed

be_! ~~alida~ed, be~_:_

could

it

in

this

case.

The

statute

in~crim~nately ~es

penditures which do not pose a danger of corruption.

ex- r

The princi-

-----------·

ple of a link to potential corruption could be rearticulated, and
Congress left free to redraft a statute which meets this requirement.

IV
i~ed

In sum, Congress appears to have
nition of
tions.

"expenditure"

in

§44lb go

beyond

that the defi-

indirect

contribu-

Under Buckley, however, the definition must be limited to

"express advocacy".

Whether the MCFL Special Editions constitute

"express advocacy" is a close

questi'on:~

order to preserve the

disclosure requirements of the FECA, it may be better to adopt a
definition of "express advocacy" which applies whenever an iden-

· - ---- --'----=::::>--

tified constituency advocates gertain candidate's in an election,
whether or not the constituency is issue-oriented.

-

-· - -----

------

This defini-

tion of "express advocacy" means that §44lb is unconstitutionally

-

--...__

....___

broad as applied to an organization like MCFL,
quirement

that

a

corporation

form a PAC

because the re-

in order

to engage in

political speech burdens the members' rights to speak and to associate without the justification that it is necessary to address
a threat of corruption.
Court

to

invalidate

the

The best approach appears to be for the
section

as

unconstitutionally

broad,

leaving Congress the option to tailor the statute to reach corporations whose expenditures present an identifiable threat of corruption.
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MEMORANDUM

To:
From:

Justice Powell

October 9, 1986

Leslie
No. 85-701

Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens For Life
Supplementary Memorandum
Massachusetts Citizens For Life
ideological organization.

(MCFL)

It claims that 2

is

u.s.c.

a nonmember 1
§44lb, which

requires that as a corporation it form a PAC in order to engage
in independent expenditures relating to candidate elections, is

1

MCFL eventuall
sta lished
PAC, and amended its Articles
of Organization an bylaws to create members~ cate ~ories. MCFL
objects to reference to this t act i:i"fiier F"ed. 'R"O'"Evlcf . 407. MCFL
insists that it only formed the PAC and became a membership
organization due to the in terrorem effect of the FEC enforcement
proceedings.

page 2.

unconstitutional as applied to it.

To succeed in its challenge,

MCFL must prove that the statute imposes a significant burden on
its First Amendment rights, and that the statute is not narrowly
tailored to further legitimate governmental objectives.
To determine the burdens that MCFL will suffer as a result of the statute, it is necessary to determine the extra burdens MCFL would suffer if it were forced to form a PAC to make an
independent expenditure.

There are ~s. ~ ' ~ lot:L

2

MCFL would have to change into a membership corpotation in order
to be able to solicit funds for the PAC.

Section 44lb(4) (C), as

~
~~ Jv

interpreted by this Court, limits solicitation for corporate PACs
~

to the corporation's members.

Thus, any time that MCFL solicited

funds for independent expenditures, it would have to ensure that
it solicited only from members.

This would prohibit activities

such as bake sales, car washes, or passing the hat after a meeting to collect funds which might be used to make independent expenditures.

MCFL could engage in such activities to fund the

organization

itself,

related

expenditures.

just

not

MCFL

to

fund

independent

would

thus

have

to

candidate-

isolate

funds

which could be used for independent expenditures from those which
could not be so used.

,,

2
An indepengent;, _e;qzendi ture is an expenditure by a group
.,_. ~ JJ..
expressly advocating tne e~ction or defeat of a clearly
~-,
identified candidate which is made without cooperation or
o1 q, ~~~
consultation with any candidate. Since we have reached the
~constitutional issue, we assume that the MCFL newsletter at issue ~~ ~ ~.
was an independent expenditure. Thus, the relevant comparison is ~~
between the burdens MCFL would suffer to make such an expenditure
if it had to form a PAC, as opposed to the burdens MCFL would
suffer to make such an expenditure if it did not have to form a
PAC to do so.
41

page 3.

The second burden is the administrative, record-keeping,

r---

and reporting requirements for PACs.
who files reports pursuant to 2
quarterly or monthly and

A PAC must have a treasurer

u.s.c.

include:

§434.

the cash on hand at the

(1)

beginning of the reporting period:

The reports must be

(2)

the total amount of re-

ceipts in a number of different categories:

(3)

(4)

tion of all contributors of over $200:

the identifica-

itemization of all

disbursements: and (5) the sum of contributions offset by operating expenses.

The reporting requirements for MCFL if it were not

required to form a PAC are that if it made an independent expendi ture over

$250,

it would have

to report

all contributors of

over $200, and identify whether such contribution was earmarked
for an independent expenditure.
It

is

important

,,

to note

that

as

far

as disclosin_g_ the

'"

names of )Contributors~ the requirement that MCFL form a PAC does
not

require

making

independent

Both as a PAC and as a group

losure.
expenditures

over

disclose contributors of over $200.

$250,

MCFL would

have

to

The fact that the disclosure

of contributors for a PAC and for a group making independent expenditures is the same cuts both ways.

On the one hand, it weak-

ens MCFL's argument as to the additional burdens it will suffer
by having to form a PAC.
ernment' s

argument

that

On the other hand,
§ 44lb

is

it weakens the gov-

necessary

in order

to compel

full disclosure.
It appears that the burdens mentioned above are signifiH

cant enough to require that the statute be narrowly tailored to
serve legitimate objectives.

First it is necessary to determine
...

page 4.

whether it serves legitimate governmental purposes as applied to
MCFL.

As mentioned above, the statute will not further the gov-

ernment's interest in disclosure of contributors.
argues

that

large

corporations

will

be

able

The government

to

funnel

money

through small ideological corporations, but this is not true because any contribution over $200 would have to be disclosed.

The

government also argues that the extensive PAC reporting requirements are necessary to keep corporations honest.

That is, with-

out the requirements small ideological organizations can act as
funnels

without

reporting

contributions

as

required

by

law.

First, this assumes that these corporations will behave illegally, which is a problematic assumption.

Second, any organization

primarily organized to support political candidates must register
as a political committee, and thus be subject to the PAC requirements.

With any organization not primarily organized to support

candidates,

the danger

that

it will

also

argues

act

as

a corporate funnel

appears remote.
The
protect

government

innocent

contributors

their money used to make

the

§44lb

is

corporation

necessary
from

to

having

independent expenditures on behalf of

The question here

candidates.

to

that

is:

is

it

important to protect

the person who buys a cake at a bake sale, or gives a donation
when the hat is passed, from having their money used by the organization for political purposes.

It appears that this concern is

much

profit-making

more

rationally

labor unions.

directed

corporations

and

With those organizations, their share-holders and

members are associated with the organization for a purpose much

page 5.

different from politics and often related to economic necessity.
Thus, their "contributions" to the corporation or labor union are
not voluntary in the same sense as a donation to a nonprofit organization.

The ability of the nonprofit contributor to monitor

the activities of the organization to which he contributes and to
terminate contributions if he is displeased is much greater than
with a shareholder or a labor union member.

As a final point, we

are concerned about the use of economic "war chests" in the
litical arena.

.EQ_-

Just because a corporation or labor union has a

lot of money which it gained from its economic activities does
not mean that its political viewpoints are supported to the same
extent.

That is, the amount of money spent (and money is in some

sense speech)

is not an accurate proxy for how widely the view-

point is held in society.

In contrast, contributions to ideolog-

ical organizations are a much more accurate proxy of how widely
the public supports

the viewpoint,

because the only reason to

give to an ideological organization is to promote the ideas espoused.

For these reasons, the government's interest in protect-

ing contributors to ideological organizations from the unwitting
use of their con tr i but ions for political purposes appears much
less strong than the government's interest in protecting corporate shareholders and labor union members from the same thing.
If the statute imposes significant burdens without strong
justifications as applied to a corporation like MCFL, it is nevertheless necessary to determine whether the statute is as narrowly drawn as possible to serve the objectives which apply to
profit-making corporations and labor unions.

Drawing a line be-

page 6.

tween profit and nonprofit corporations would be simple, but may
not accurately isolate those corporations which the FEC may not
legitimately seek to regulate.

Of course,

this Court does not

have to write a new statute, but in the inquiry as to whether the
statute is narrowly tailored, it is relevant to determine whether
a

rational

line

other

than

between

corporations

and

noncorporations can be drawn.

Amicus Common Cause suggests some

guidelines which

legitimate concerns of Congress.

address

the

Although they seem complex at first, they appear to be workable.
Amicus would apply four factors to determine whether a corpora(1) the corporation

tion falls outside the restriction of §44lb:
must be a

not-for-profit

corporation

that does not engage
(2)

business or commercial transactions of any kind;

in

the corpo-

ration must not have any shareholders or other affiliated persons
with a claim to any of its assets or earnings;

(3)

the corpora-

tion must not have been established by a business corporation or
labor union and it must not accept contributions from business
corporations, labor unions or other artificial entities;

and (4)

the corporation must have been formed for the express purpose of
promotion of political or

ideological positions,

and

its sole

source of funds must be voluntary contributions from individuals
who have been informed that the funds will be spent for campaignrelated purposes.
In sum,

the question presented in this case is close,

because there is no absolute limit on expenditures by a corporation like MCFL, only a regulatory burden.

Nevertheless, because

it appears that as applied to a small organization the burdens

-page 7.

are significant and that Congress could tailor the statute more
narrowly to cover only corporations where the danger of corruption

and

misuse

of contributors'

funds

is present,

it appears

that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to MCFL.
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1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 85-701

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, APPELLANT v.
MASSACHUSETTS CITIZENS FOR LIFE, INC.
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
[November-, 1986]

JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
The questions for decision here arise under § 441b of the
Federal Election Cam~~ Act (FECA or Act), 2 U. S. C.
§§ 431-455 (1982). T~st question is whether respondent
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL), a non-profit,
non-stock corporation, by financing certain activity with its
treasury funds, has violated the restriction on independent
spending contained in § 441b of the Act. That section prohibits corporations from using treasury funds to make an expenditure "in connection with any election to any public office," and requires that any expenditure for such purpose be
financed by voluntary contributions to ~arate segregated
fund. If respondent has violated § 441~e next question is
whether appfication ofthat section toMCFL's conduct is constitutional. We hold that the respondent's use of its treasury funds is p~ted by §441b, but that IT41b is unconstit~ to the activity of which the Federal
ElectiOn Commission (FEC or Commission) complains.
I
A

MCFL was incorporated in January, 1973 as a non-profit,
non-stock corporation under Massachusetts law. Its cor-
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porate purpose as stated in its articles of incorporation is
"To foster respect for human life and to defend the right
to life of all human beings, born and unborn, through
educational, political and other forms of activities and in
addition to engage in any other lawful act or activity for
which corporations may be organized ... "
App. 84. MCFL does not accept contributions from business
corporations or unions. Its resources come from volUntary
donations from Tt'members," and from various fund-raising activities such as garage sales, bake sales, dances, raffles, and
picnics. The corporation considers its "members" those persons who have either contributed to the organization in the
past or indicated support for its activities. 1
Respondent has engaged in diverse educational and legislative activities designed to further its agenda. It has organized an ecumenical prayer service for the unborn in front of
the Massachusetts State House; sponsored a regional conference to discuss the issues of abortion and euthenasia; provided speakers for discussion groups, debates, lectures, and
media programs; and sponsored an annual March for Life.
In addition, it has drafted and submitted legislation, some of
which has become law in Massachusetts; sponsored testimony
on proposed legislation; and has urged its members to contact
their elected representatives to express their opinion on legislative proposals.
MCFL began publishing a newsletter in January, 1973. It
was distributed as a matter of course to contributors, and,
when funds permitted, to non-contributors who had ex1
MCFL concedes that under this Court's decision in Federal Election
Commission v. National Right to Work Committee, 459 U. S. 197 (1982),
such a definition does not permit it to solicit contributions from such persons for use by a separate segregated fund established under the Act.
That case held that in order to be considered a "member" of an non-stock
corporation under the Act, one must have "some relatively enduring and
independently significant financial or organizational attachment" to the
corporation. 459 U. S., at 204.
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pressed support for the organization. The total distribution of
any one issue has never exceeded 6,000. The newsletter
was published irregularly from 1973 through 1978: three
times in 1973, five times in 1974, eight times in 1975, eight
times in 1976, five times in 1977, and four times in 1978.
App. 88. Each of the newsletters bore a masthead identifying it as the "Massachusetts Citizens for Life Newsletter," as
well as a volume and issue number. The publication typically contained appeals for volunteers and contributions, and
information on MCFL activities, as well as on matters such
as the results of hearings on bills and constitutional amendments, the status of particular legislation, the outcome of referenda, court decisions, and administrative hearings.
Newsletter recipients were usually urged to contact the relevant decision-makers and express their opinion.
B

In September 1978, MCFL prepared and distributed a
"Special Election Edition" prior to the September 1978 primacyeTections. While the May 1978 newsletter had been
mailed to 2,109 people and the October 1978 newsletter to
3,119 people, more than 100,000 copies of the "Special Election Edition" were printed for distribution. The front page
of the publication was headlined "EVERYTHING YOU
NEED TO KNOW TO VOTE PRO-LIFE," and readers
were admonished that "[n]o pro-life candidate can win in November without your vote in September." "VOTE PROLIFE" was printed in large bold-faced letters on the back
page, and a coupon was provided to be clipped and taken to
the polls to remind voters of the name of the "pro-life" candidates. Next to the exhortation to vote "pro-life" was a disclaimer: "This special election edition does not represent an
endorsement of any particular candidate." App. 101.
To aid the reader in selecting candidates, the flyer listed
the candidates for each state and federal office in every voting district in Massachusetts, and identified each one as

85-701-0PINION
4

FEC v. MASSACHUSETTS CITIZENS FOR LIFE

either supporting or opposing what MCFL regarded as the
correct position on three issues. A "y" indicated that a candidate supported the MCFL view on a particular issue and an
"n" indicated that the candidate opposed it. An asterisk was
placed next to the names of those incumbents who had made
a "special contribution to the unborn in maintaining a 100%
pro-life voting record in the state house by actively supporting MCFL legislation." While some 400 candidates were
running for office in the primary, the "Special Edition" featured the photographs of only thirteen. These thirteen had
received a triple "y" rating, or were identified either as having a 100% favorable voting record or as having stated a position consistent with that of MCFL. No candidate whose
photograph was featured had received even one "n" rating.
The "Special Edition" was edited by an officer of MCFL
who was not part of the staff that prepared the MCFL newsletters. The "Special Edition" was mailed free of charge and
without request to 5,986 contributors, and to 50,674 others
whom MCFL regarded as sympathetic to the organization's
purposes. The Commission asserts that the remainder of
the 100,000 issues were placed in public areas !for general dis-·
tribution, but MCFL insists that no copies were made available to the general public. 2 The "Special Edition" was not
identified on its masthead as a special edition of the regular
newsletter, although the MCFL logotype did appear at its
top. The words "Volume 5, No. 3, 1978" were apparently
handwritten on the Edition submitted to the FEC, but the
record indicates that the actual Volume 5, No. 3 was distributed in May-June, 1977. The corporation spent $9.812.,76 to
publish and circulate the "Special Edition," all of which was
taken from its general treasu!'Y funds.
The FEC submitted an affidavit from a person who stated that she
obtained a copy of the Special Election Edition at a statewide conference of
the National Organization for Women, where a stack of about 200 copies
were available to the general public. App. 174.
2
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A complaint was filed with the Commission alleging that
the "Special Edition" was a violation of § 441b. The complaint maintained that the Edition represented an expenditure of funds from a corporate treasury to distribute to the
general public a campaign flyer on behalf of certain political
candidates. The FEC found reason to believe that such a violation had occurred, initiated an investigation, and determined that probable cause existed to believe that MCFL had
violated the Act. After conciliation efforts failed, the Commission filed a complaint in the District Court under
§ 437(g)(a)(6)(A), seeking a civil penalty and other appropriate relief.
Both parties moved for summary judgment. The District
Court granted MCFL's motion, holding that: (1) the election
publications could not be regarded as "expenditures" under
§ 441b(b)(2); (2) the "Special Edition" was exempt from the
statutory prohibition by virtue of§ 439(9)(B)(i), which in general exempts news commentary distributed by a periodical
publication unaffiliated with any candidate or political party;
and (3) if the statute applied to MCFL, it was unconstitutional as a violation of the First Amendment., 589 F. Supp.
649 (D. Mass. 1984).
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held
that the statute was applicable to MCFL, but affirmed the
District Court's holding that the statute as so applied was unconstitutional. 769 F. 2d 13 (CAl 1985). We granted certiorari, and now ~m.
----.:_
II
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the "Special Edition" is not outside the reach of § 441b. First, we find no
merit in respondent's contention that preparation and distribution of the "Special Edition" does not fall within that section's definition of "expenditure." Section 441b defines "contribution or expenditure" as the provision of various things of
value "to any candidate, campaign committee, or political
party or organization, in connection with any election . . ."
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(emphasis added). MCFL contends that, since it supplied
nothing to any candidate or organization, the publication is
not within § 441b. However, the general definitions section
of the Act contains a broader definition of "expenditure," including within that term the provision of anything of value
made ''for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal
office ... " 2 U. S. C. § 431(9)(A)(1). (emphasis added).
Since the language of the statute does not alone resolve the
issue, we must look to the legislative history of § 441b to determine the scope of the term "expenditure." 3
That history clearly confirms that § 441 b was meant to_£!"0scribe e
n it e i co ne tion with an election. We have
exhaustively recounted the legislative history of the predecessors of this section in prior decisions. See Pipejitters Local
Union 562 v. United States, 407 U. S. 385, 402-409 (1972);
United States v. Auto Workers, 352 U. S. 567, 570-587
(1957). This history makes clear that Congress has long regarded it as insufficient merely to restrict payments made directly to candidates or campaign organizations. The first explicit expression of this came in 1947, when the Taft-Hartley
Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101 § 304, 61 Stat. 136, 159 (1947),
amended 18 U. S. C. § 610, the criminal statute prohibiting
corporate contributions and expenditures to candidates.
3
MCFL argues that the definition in the general definitions section is
not as broad as it appears, for§ 431(9)(B)(v) of that section says that nothing shall be considered an "expenditure" under § 431 that would not be regarded as such under§ 441b(b). Therefore, MCFL argues, the definition
of expenditure under § 431 necessarily incorporates § 441b's restriction of
that term to payments to a candidate. It is puzzling, however, why§ 431
would in one subsection purport to define an expenditure as a payment
made for the purpose of influencing an election and in another subsection
eliminate precisely that type of activity from the ambit of its definition.
The answer may lie in the fact that § 441(b)(2) says that expenditures "include" payments to a candidate, a term that indicates that activities not
specifically enumerated in that section may nonetheless be encompassed by
it. In any event, the need for such speculation signals that the language of
the statute is not on its face dispositive.
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The statute as amended forbade any corporation or labor
organization to make a "contribution or expenditure in connection with any election ... " for federal office. The 1946
report of the House Special Committee to Investigate Campaign Expenditures explained the rationale for the amendment, noting that it would undermine the basic objective of
§610
"if it were assumed that the term 'making any contribution' related only to the donating of money directly, and
excluded the vast expenditures of money in the activities
herein shown to be engaged in extensively. Of what
avail would a law be to prohibit the contributing direct to
a candidate and yet permit the expenditure of large sums
in his behalf?
H. R. Rep. No. 2739, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 36-37 (1947),
quoted in Auto Workers, supra, at 581.
During the legislative debate on the bill, Senator Taft was
asked whether § 610 permitted a newspaper published by a
railway union to put out a special edition in support of a political candidate, or whether such activity would be considered a political expenditure. The Senator' replied, "If it
were supported by union funds contributed by union members as union dues it would be a violation of the law, yes. It
is exactly as if a railroad itself, using stockholders' funds,
published such an advertisement in the newspaper supporting one candidate as against another ... " 93 Cong. Rec.
6436-6437 (1947).
United States v. C/0, 335 U. S. 106 (1948), narrowed the
scope of this prohibition, by permitting the use of union funds
to publish a special edition of the weekly C/0 News distributed to union members and purchasers of the issue. In Auto
Workers, supra, however, we held that a union was subject
to indictment for using union dues to sponsor political advertisements on commercial television. Distinguishing CI 0,
we stated that the concern of the statute "is the use of corporation or union funds to influence the public at large to vote
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for a particular candidate or a particular party." 352 U. S.,
at 589.
The Federal Election Campaign Act enacted the prohibition now found in § 441b. This portion of the Act simply
ratified the existing understanding of the scope of§ 610. See
Pipejitters, supra, at 410-411. Representative Hansen, the
sponsor of the provision, declared:
"The effect of this language is to carry out the basic intent of section 610, which is to prohibit the use of union
or corporate funds for active electioneering directed at
the general public on behalf of a candidate in a Federal
election."
117 Cong. Rec. H43379 (1971).
The representative
concluded:
"The net effect of the amendment, therefore, is to
tighten and clarify the provisions of section 610 of title
18, United States Code, and to codify the case law."
lbid. 4 Thus, the fact that §441b uses the phrase "to any
candidate ... in connection with any electiqn," while § 610
provides "in connection with any federal election," is not evidence that Congress abandoned its restriction, in force since
1947, on expenditures on behalf of candidates. We therefore
find no merit in MCFL's argument that only payments to a
candidate or organization fall within the scope of§ 441b.
Respondent next argues that the definition of an expenditure under § 441b necessarily incorporates the requirement
that a communication "expressly advocate" the election of
candidates, and that its "Special Edition" does not constitute
express advocacy. The argument relies on the portion of
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976), that upheld the disclosure requirement for expenditures by individuals other than
candidates and by groups other than political committees.
'See also 117 Cong. Rec. 43381 (remarks of Rep. Hays), 43383-43385
(remarks of Rep. Thompson), 43388-43389 (remarks of Reps. Steiger and
Gude).
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See 2 U. S. C. § 434(c). There, in order to avoid problems of
overbreadth, the Court held that the term "expenditure" encompassed "only funds used for communications that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified
candidate." 424 U. S., at 80 (footnote omitted). The rationale for this holding was that
"the distinction between discussion of issues and candidates and advocacy of election or defeat of candidates
may often dissolve in practical application. Candidates,
especially incumbents, are intimately tied to public issues involving legislative proposals and governmental
actions. Not only do candidates campaign on the basis
of their positions on various issues, but campaigns themselves generate issues of public interest."
ld., at 42 (footnote omitted).
We agree with respondent that this rationale requires a
similar construction of the more intrusive provision tha~
rectly regulates independent spending. We thereforeC!.!Q!d)l
that an expenditure must constitute "express advocacy" in
or r to be subJect to the rohihltion of §441b. We also
o
owever, that the publication of the "Special Edition"
constitutes "express advocacy. tr
~
Buckley adopted the "express advocacy" requirement to
distinguish discussion of issues and candidates from more
pointed exhortations to vote for particular persons. We
therefore concluded in that case that a finding of "express advocacy" depended upon the use of language such as "vote
for," "elect," "support," etc., Buckley, supra, at 44, n. 52.
Just such exhoration appears in the "Sp~cial Edition." The
publication not only urges voters to vote for "pro::Yife" candidates, but also identifies and prov1des photo~aplis of specific
canaidates fitting tna£<fe8Crlptro~ The E 1tfon cannot be
regarded as a mere discussion of public issues that by their
nature raise the names of certain politicians. Rather, it provides in effect an explicit directive: vote for these [named]
candidates. The fact that this message is marginally less di-
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rect than "Vote for Smith" does not change its essential nature. The Edition goes beyond issue discussion to express
electoral advocacy. The disclaimer of endorsement cannot
negate this fact. The Special Election Edition thus falls
squarely within § 441b, for it represents express advocacy of
the election of particular candidates distributed to members
of the general public.
Finally, MCFL argues that it is entitled to the press exemption under 2 U. S. C. § 431(9)(B)(i) reserved for
"any news story, commentary, or editorial distributed
through the facilities of any ... newspaper, magazine,
or other periodical publication, unless such facilities are
owned or controlled by any political party, political committee, or candidate."
MCFL maintains that its regular newsletter is a "periodical publication" within this definition, and that the "Special
Edition" should be regarded as just another issue in the continuing newsletter series. The legislative history on the
press exemption is sparse; the House of Representatives' Report on this section states merely that the exemption was designed to
:
"make it plain that it is not the intent of Congress in the
present legislation to limit or burden in any way the first
amendment freedoms of the press or of association.
[The exemption] assures the unfettered right of the
newspapers, TV networks, and other media to cover and
comment on political campaigns."
H. R. Rep. No. 93-1239, p. 4 (1974). We need not decide
whether the regular MCFL newsletter is exempt under this
provision, because, even assuming that it is, the "Special
Edition" cannot be considered comparable to any single issue
of the newsletter. It was not published through the facilities
of the regular newsletter, but by a staff which prepared no
previous or subsequent newsletters. It was not distributed
to the newsletter's regular audience, but to a group twenty
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times the size of that audience, most of whom were members
of the public who had never received the newsletter. No
characteristic of the Edition associated it in any way with the
normal MCFL publication. The MCFL masthead did not appear on the flyer, and, despite an apparent belated attempt
to make it appear otherwise, the Edition contained no volume
and issue number identifying it as one in a continuing series
of issues.
MCFL protests that determining the scope of the press exemption by reference to such factors inappropriately focuses
on superficial considerations of form. However, it is precisely such factors that in combination permit the distinction
of campaign flyers from regular publications. We regard
such an inquiry as essential, since we cannot accept the notion that the distribution of such flyers by entities that happen to publish newsletters automatically entitles such organizations to the press exemption. A contrary position would
open the door for those corporations and unions with in-house
publications to engage in unlimited spending directly from
their treasuries to distribute campaign material to the general public, thereby eviscerating § 441b's prohibition. 5
In sum, we hold that MQ_fL's publication and distribution
of the Special Election Edition is in viol2lon of i_44lb. We
therefore turn to the constitutionality of that proVfSlon as applied to respondent.
III
A
Independent expenditures constitute expression "at the
core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment
freedoms." Buckley, supra, at 39 (quoting Williams v.
6
Nor do we find the Special Election Edition akin to the normal business activity of a press entity deemed by some lower courts to fall within
the exemption, such as the distribution of a letter soliciting subscriptions,
see FEC v. Phillips Publishing Co., 517 F. Supp. 1308, 1313 (DDC 1981),
or the dissemination of publicity, see Reader's Digest Association v. FEC,
509 F. Supp. 1210 (SDNY 1981).

\
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Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23, 32 (1968)). See also Federal Election
Commission v. National Conservative Political Action Committee (NCPAC), - - U. S. - - , (1985) (independent expenditures "produce speech at the core of the First Amendment").
We must therefore determine whether the
prohibition of § 441b burdens political speech, and, if so,
whether such a burden is justified by a compelling state interest. Buckley, 424 U. S., at 44-45.
The FEC contends that the Act does not infringe upon
MCFL's First Amendment rights, since the corporation is
free to establish a separate segregated fund that may engage
in unlimited spending. Consideration of this argument requires comparison of the regulations to which MCFL is subject by virtue of operating such a fund with those that would
apply if it were not required to do so.
If it were not incorporated, MCFL's obligations under the
Act would be those specified by§ 434(c), the section that prescribes the duties of "[e]very person (other than a political
committee)." 6 Section 434(c) provides that any such person
that during a year makes independent expenditures exceeding $250 must: (1) identify all contributors: who contribute
over $200 in the aggregate in a given year, § 434(c)(l); (2) disclose the name and address of recipients of independent expenditures exceeding $200 in the aggregate, along with an indication of whether the money was used to support or oppose
a particular candidate, § 434(c)(2)(A); and (3) identify any persons who make contributions over $200 that are earmarked
for the purpose of furthering independent expenditures,
All unincorporated organizations whose
§ 434(c)(2)(C).
6Jn Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976), this Court said that an entity
subject to regulation as a "political committee" under the Act is one that is
either "under the control of a candidate or the major purpose of which is
the nomination or election of a candidate. " !d., at 79. It is undisputed on
this record that MCFL fits neither of these descriptions. Its central organizational purpose is issue advocacy, although it occasionally engages in activities on behalf of political candidates.
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major purpose is not campaign advocacy, but who occas.ionally make independent expenditures on behalf of candidates,
are subject only to these regulations.
Because it is incorporated, however, MCFL must establish
a "separate segregated fund" if it wishes to engage in any independent spending whatsoever. § 441b(a),(b)(2)(C). Since
such a fund is considered a "political committee" under the
Act,§ 431(4)(B), all MCFL independent expenditure activity,
is as a result, regulated as though the organization's major
purpose is to further the election of candidates. This me~ns
that MCFL must comply with several requirements in addition to those mentioned. Under §432, it must appoint _a
treasurer, § 432(a); ensure that contributions are forwarded
to the treasurer within ten or thirty days of receipt, depending on the amount of contribution, § 432(b)(2); see that its
treasurer keeps an account of: every contribution regardless
of amount, the name and address of any person who makes .a
contribution in excess of $50, all contributions received from
political committees, and the name and address of any perso_n
to whom a disbursement is made regardless of amount,
§ 432(c); and preserve receipts for all disbursements over
$200 and all records for three years, § 432(c),(d). Under
§ 433, MCFL must file a statement of organization containing
its name, address, the name of its custodian of records, and
its banks, safety deposit boxes, or other depositori~s,
§ 433(a),(b); report any change in the above information
within ten days, § 433(c); and may dissolve only upon filing a
written statement that it will no longer receive any contributions nor make disbursements, and that it has no outstanding
debts or obligations, § 433(d)(l).
Under § 434, MCFL must file either monthly reports with
the FEC or reports on the following schedule: quarterly reports during election years, a pre-election report no later
than the twelfth day before an election, a post-election report
within 30 days after an election, and reports every six
months during non-election years, § 434(a)(4)(A),(B). These
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reports must contain information regarding the amount of
cash on hand; the total amount of receipts, detailed by ten different categories; the identification of each political committee and candidate's authorized or affiliated committee making
contributions, and any persons making loans, providing rebates, refunds, dividends, or interest or any other offset to
operating expenditures in an aggregate amount over $200;
the total amount of all disbursements, detailed by twelve different categories; the names of all authorized or affiliated
committees to whom expenditures aggreggating over $200
have been made; persons to whom loan repayments or refunds have been made; the total sum of all contributions, operating expenses, outstanding debts and obligations, and the
settlement terms of the retirement of any debt or obligation.
§ 434(b). In addition, MCFL may solicit contributions for its
separate segregated fund only from its "members,"
441b(4)(A),(C), which does not include those persons who
have merely contributed to or indicated support for the organization in the past. See National Right to Work Committee, 459 U. S., at 204.
It is evident from this survey that MCFL is subject to
more extensive re uiTeiilents and more strin ent restri~tions
than it would be If it were not incor orate . These additional regulations may create a disincentive for such organizations to engage in political speech. Detailed recordkeeping an<raiSCTOsureoblrgatiOn~along with the duty to
appoint a treasurer and custodian of the records, impose administrative costs that many small entities may be unable to
bear. 7 Furthermore, such duties require a far more com7
It is true that we acknowledged in Buckley, supra, that, although the
reporting and disclosure requirements of the Act "will deter some individuals who otherwise might contribute," id., at 68, this is a burden that is
justified by substantial government interests. I d., at 66-68. However,
while the effect of additional reporting and disclosure obligations on an
organization's contrilrutors may not necessarily constitute an additional .
burden on speech, the administrative costs of complying with such in-

85-701-0PINION
FEC v. MASSACHUSETTS CITIZENS FOR LIFE

15

plex and formalized organization than many small groups
could manage. Restriction of solicitation of contributions to
"members" either vastly reduces the sources of funding for
organizations with no formal members, or requires the creation of some type of organizational affiliation, sufficiently
documented, for those persons who would be solicited. It is
not unreasonable to suppose that, as in this case, an incorporated group of like-minded persons might seek donations to
support the dissemination of their political ideas, and their
occasional endorsement of political candidates, by means of
garage sales, bake sales, and raffles. Such persons might
well be turned away by the prospect of complying with all the
requirements imposed by the Act. Faced with the need to
assume a more sophisticated organizational form, to adopt
specific accounting procedures, to file periodic detailed reports, and to monitor garage sales lest non-members take a
fancy to the merchandise on display, it would not be surprising if at least some groups decided that the contemplated political activity was simply not worth it. 8
Thus, while § 441b does not remove all op ortunities for independen spen mg y orgamzations sue as CFL, the avenUe1tle'aVeSOpen is more burdensome than the one it forecloses. TlieTaa that the statute's practical effect may be to
discourage protected speech is sufficient to characterize
§ 441b as an infringement on First Amendment activities.
In Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U. S. 51 (1965), for instance,
we held that the absence of certain procedural safeguards
rendered unconstitutional a state's film censorship program.
Such procedures were necessary, we said, because, as a praccreased responsibilities may create a disincentive for the organization itself
to speak.
8
The fact that MCFL established a political committee in 1980 does not
change this conclusion, for the corporation's speech may well have been inhibited due to its inability to form such an entity before that date. Furthermore, other organizations comparable to MCFL may not find it feasible to establish such a committee, and may therefore decide to forego
engaging in independent political speech .

.'
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tical matter, without them "it may prove too burdensome to
seek review of the censor's determination." I d., at 59.
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513 (1958), reviewed a state
program under which taxpayers applying for a certain tax exemption bore the burden of proving that they did not advocate the overthrow of the United States and would not support a foreign government against this country. We noted,
"In practical operation, therefore, this procedural device
must necessarily produce a result which the State could not
command directly. It can only result in a deterrence of
speech which the Constitution makes free." I d., at 526.
The same may be said of § 441b, for its practical effect is to
make engaging in protected speech a severely demanding
task. 9
B

When a statutory provision burdens First Amendment
rights, it must be justified by a compelling state interest.
Williams v. Rhodes, supra, 393 U.S., at "31; NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 438 (1963). The FEC first insists that
justification for § 441b's expenditure restriction is provided
by this Court's acknowledgment that "the special characteristics of the corporate structure require particularly careful
regulation." National Right to Work Committee, supra, at
209-210. The Commission thus relies on the long history of
regulation of corporate political activity as support for the
9
The Commission relies on Regan v. Taxation With Representation,
461 U. S. 540 (1983), in support of its contention that the requirement that
independent spending be conducted through a separate segregated fund
does not burden MCFL's First Amendment rights. Regan, however, involved the requirement that a non-profit corporation establish a separate
lobbying entity if contributions to the corporation for the conduct of other
activities were to be tax-deductible. If the corporation chose not to set up
such a lobbying arm, it would not be eligible for tax-deductible contributions. Such a result, however, would infringe no protected activity, for
there is no right to have speech subsidized by the government. 461 U. S.,
at 545-546. By contrast, the activity that may be discouraged in this case,
independent spending, is core political speech under the First Amendment.
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application of § 441b to MCFL. Evaluation of the Commission's argument requires close examination of the underlying
rationale for this long-standing regulation.
It is true that this Court has consistently noted with approval the series of Congressional efforts to restrict the direct participation of corporations in electoral affairs. See
National Right to Work Committee, 459 U. S., at 208-210;
Pipejitters, supra, at 402-409; Auto Workers, supra, at
570-87. Those efforts, however, have been prompted by
concerns that are not implicated by the activity of organizations such as respondent. In upholding a different provision
of§ 441b in National Right to Work Committee, supra, we
described that section as an attempt to regulate the "substantial aggregations of wealth amassed by the special advantages which go with the corporate form of organization."
459 U. S., at 207. We later characterized that decision as
upholding a provision designed to restrict "the influence of
political war chests funneled through the corporate form."
NCPAC, supra, at-- (1985). In Pipejitters, supra, we
observed that the objective of predecessor s't atute § 610 was
to "eliminate the effect of aggregated wealth on federal elections." 407 U. S., at 416. In Auto Workers, supra, we held
that a labor union could be indicted under § 610 for sponsoring a campaign broadcast intended for the general public,
given consistent Congressional efforts to curb the political influence of "those who exercise control over large aggregations of capital." 352 U. S., at 567.
This concern over the corrosive influence of concentrated
wealth reflects the conviction that it is important to protect
the integrity of the marketplace of political ideas. It acknowledges the wisdom of Justice Holmes' observation that
"the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in
ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the thought
to get itself accepted in the competition of the market . . ."
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Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes
and Brandeis, JJ., dissenting). 10
Direct corporate spending on political activity raises the
prospect that resources amassed in the economic marketplace
may be used to provide an unfair advantage in the political
marketplace. Political "free trade" does not necessarily require that all who participate in the political marketplace do
so with exactly equal resources. See NCPAC, supra, at
- - (1985)(invalidating limits on independent spending by
political committees); Buckley, supra, at 39-51 (striking
down expenditure limits in 1971 Campaign Act). Relative
availability of funds is after all a rough barometer of public
support. The resources in the treasury of a business corporation, however, are not an indication of popular support
for the corporation's political ideas. They reflect instead the
economically motivated decisions of investors and customers.
The availability of these resources may make a corporation a
formidable political presence, even though the power of the
corporation may be no reflection of the power of its ideas.
By requiring that corporate independent expenditures be
financed through a political committee expressly established
to engage in campaign spending, § 441b seeks to prevent this
threat to the political marketplace. The resources available
to this fund, as opposed to the corporate treasury, in fact reflect popular support for the political positions of the committee. Pipejitters, supra, acknowledged this objective of
§ 441b in noting the statement of Representative Hansen, its
10

While this market metaphor has guided Congressional regulation in
the area of campaign activity, First Amendment speech is not necessarily
limited to such an instrumental role. As Justice Brandeis stated in his discussion of political speech in his concurrence in Whitney v. California:
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the state
was to make men free to develop their faculties; and that in its government
the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an end and as a means.
274 u. s. 357, 375 (1927).
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sponsor, that the "underlying theory" of this regulation "is
that substantial general purpose treasuries should not be diverted to political purposes," and that requiring funding by
voluntary contributions would ensure that "the money collected is that intended by those who contribute to be used for
political purposes and not money diverted from another
source." 407 U. S., at 423-424 (quoting 117 Cong. Rec.
43381).u See also Auto Workers, supra, at 582 (Congress
added proscription on expenditures to Corrupt Practices Act
"to protect the political process from what it deemed to be
the corroding effect of money employed in elections by aggregated power"). The expenditure restrictions of § 441b are
thus meant to ensure that competition among actors in the
political arena is truly competition among ideas.
Regulation of co~ity t~ected
concern not about use of the cor r te form er se, but about
the otential for unfair deployment of wealth for olitical purposes.12 Groups such as MCFL, however, do not pose that
danger of corruption. MCFL was formed to disseminate political ideas, not to amass capital. The resources it has available are not a functionof its success in the economic marketplace, but its popularity in the political marketplace. While
MCFL may derive some advantages from its corporate form,
While business corporations may not represent the only organizations
that pose this danger, they are by far the most prominent example of entities that enjoy legal advantages enhancing their ability to accumulate
wealth. That Congress does not at present seek to regulate every possible type of firm fitting this description does not undermine its justification
for regulating corporations. Rather, Congress' decision represents the
"careful legislative adjustment of the federal electoral laws, in a 'cautious
advance, step by step,'" to which we have said we owe considerable deference. National Right to Work Committee, supra, 459 U. S., at 209 (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp ., 301 U. S. 1, 46 (1937).
2
' The regulation imposed as a result of this concern is of course distinguishable from the complete foreclosure of any opportunity for political
speech that we invalidated in the state referendum context in First N ational Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765 (1978)
11
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those are advantages that redound to its benefit as a political
organization, not as a profit-making enterprise. In short,
MCFL is not the type of "traditional corporation[] organized
for economic gain," NCPAC, supra, at--, that has been
the focus of regulation of corporate political activity.
National Right to Work Committee, supra, does not support the inclusion of MCFL within § 441b's restriction on direct independent spending. That case upheld the application
to a non-profit corporation of a different provision of § 441b:
the limitation on who can be solicited for contributions to a
political committee. However, the political activity at issue
in that case was contributions, as the committee had been established for the purpose of making direct contributions to
political candidates. 459 U. S., at 200. We have consistently held that restrictions on contributions re uire less compellin ·ustification than res r1ctions on mde endent spend~· N PA ,
. . , a --;California Me tea ssn. v.
Federal Election Commission, 453 U. S. 182, 194, 196-197
(1981); Buckley, supra, at 20-22.
In light of the historical role of contributions in the corruption of the electoral process, the need for a broad prophylactic rule was thus sufficient in National Right to Work Committee to support a limitation on the ability of a committee to
raise money for direct contributions. This case, however,
involves core political speech, the regulation of which demands far greater precision than § 441b provides. The desirability of a broad prophylactic rule cannot justify treating
alike business corporations and respondent in the regulation
of independent spending.
The Commission next argues in support of§ 441b that that
it prevents an organization from using an individual's money
for purposes that the individual may not support. We acknowledged the legitimacy of this concern as to the dissenting stockholder and union member in National Right to
Work, supra, at 208, and in Pipe.fitters, supra, at 414-15.
But such persons, as noted, contribute investment funds or
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union dues for economic gain, and do not necessarily authorize the use of their money for political ends. Furthermore,
because such individuals depend on the organization for income or for a job, it is not enough to tell them that any unhappiness with the use of their money can be redressed simply
by leaving the corporation or the union. It was thus wholly
reasonable for Congress to require the establishment of a
separate political fund to which persons can make voluntary
contributions.
This rationale for regulation is not compelling with respect
to independent expenditures by respondent. Individuals \
who contribute to respondent are fully aware of its political
purposes, and in fact contribute precisely because they support those purposes. It is true that a contributor may not be
aware of the exact use to which his or her money ultimately
may be put, or the specific candidate that it may be used to
support. However, individuals contribute to a political organization in part because they regard such a contribution as a
more effective means of advocacy than spending the money
under their own personal direction. Any contribution therefore necessarily involves at least some degree of delegation of
authority to use such funds in a manner that best serves the
shared political purposes of the organization and contributor.
In addition, an individual desiring more direct control over
the use of his or her money can simply earmark the contribution for a specific purpose, an option whose availability does
not depend on the applicability of § 441b. Cf. § 434(c)(2)(C)
(entities other than political committees must disclose names
of those persons making earmarked contributions over $200).
Finally, a contributor dissatisfied with how funds are used
can simply stop contributing.
The Commission maintains that, even if contributors may
be aware that a contribution to respondent will be used for
political purposes in general, they may not wish such money
to be used for electoral campaigns in particular. That is,
persons may desire that an organization use their contribu-

r
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tions to further a certain cause, but may not want the organization to use their money to urge support for or opposition
to political candidates solely on the basis of that cause. This
concern can be met, however, by means far more narrowly
tailored and less burdensome than § 441b's restriction on direct expenditures: simply requiring that contributors be informed that their money may be used for such a purpose.
It is true that National Right to Work, supra, held that the
goal of protecting minority interests justified solicitation restrictions on a non-profit corporation operating a political
committee established to make direct contributions to candidates. As we have noted above, however, the government
enjoys greater latitude in limiting contributions than in regulating independent expenditures. Supra, at - - . Given a
contributor's awareness of the political activity of the respondent, as well as the readily available remedy of refusing
further donations, the interest protecting contributors is simply insufficient to support § 441b's restriction on the independent spending of MCFL.
Finally, the FEC maintains that the inapplicability of
§ 441b to MCFL would open the door to massive undisclosed
political spending by similar entities, and to their use as conduits for undisclosed spending by business corporations and
unions. We see no such danger. Even if§ 441b is inapplicable, an in~iture of as little as $250 by MCFL
will trigger the disclosure provisions of§ 434(c). As a result,
MCFL will be re uired to identify all contributors who provide annual a egate n s excee mg 2 , willn ave to
specify all recip en s o m epen en spen mg amounting to
more than $200, and will be bound to identify all persons
making contributions over $200 who request that the money
be used for independent expenditures. These reporting obligations provide precisely the information necessary to monitor MCFL's independent spending activity and its receipt of
contributions. The state interest in disclosure therefore can
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be met in a manner less restrictive than imposing the full
panoply of regulations that accompany status as a political
committee under the Act.
Furthermore, should MCFL's independent spending become so extensive that the organization's major purpose may
be regarded as campaign activity, the corporation would be
classified as a political committee. See Buckley, supra, at
79. As such, it would automatically be subject to the obligations and restrictions applicable to those groups whose primary objective is to influence political campaigns. In sum, \
there is no need for the sake of disclosure to treat MCFL any
differently than other organizations that only occasionally engage in independent spending on behalf of candidates.

c
Our conclusion is that § 441b's r~%ic:ioMC~ependent
s ending is unconstitutional as app 1e o
L, for it infringes protected speec wit ou a compel ing justification
for such infringement. We acknowledge the legitimacy of
Congress' concern that organizations that amass eat wealth
in t~e e cono~i~ketp~e not gam un air a vantage in the
poh 1ca mar e place. Not all corpora_lli>ns, however, implicat:e this co~ern. Somen ave feat!!!'eS moi_e akin to v olunta~ns than business firms, and therefore
should not have to bear burdens on independent spending
solely because of their incorporated status. Such corporations have three features in common, and an organization
must possess aifthre~ from the reach of §441b's
restriction on independent spending. cE]itt, a corporation
must be formed for the express purpose of promoting political ideas, and cannot engage in business activities. If political fundraising events are expressly denominated as requests
for contributions that will be used for political purposes, including direct expenditures, these events cannot be considered business activities. This ensures that political re-

1

?
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sources reflect political support. Second, the corporation
must have no shareholders or other persons affiliated so as to
have a claim on its assets or earnings. This ensures that
persons connected with the organization will have no economic disincentive for disassociating with it if they disagree
with its political activity. 13 Third, the corporation may not
be established by a business corporation or a labor union, nor
may it accept contri~~ This prevents such corporations from serving as conduits for the type
of direct spending that may constitutionally be proscribed
under the Act.
It may be that the class of organizations affected by our
holding today will be small. That prospect, however, does
not diminish the significance of the rights at stake. Freedom of speech plays a fundamental role in a democracy; as
this Court has said, freedom of thought and speech "is the
matrix, the indispensible condition, of nearly every other
form of freedom." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 327
(1937). Our pursuit of other governmental ends, however,
may tempt us to accept in small increments a loss that would
be unthinkable if inflicted all at once. For: this reason, we
must be as vigilant against the modest diminution of speech
we are as against its sweeping restriction. Where at all possible, government must curtail speech only to the degree necessary to meet the particular problem at hand, and must
avoid infringing on speech that does not pose the danger that
has prompted regulation. In enacting the provision at issue
8
' This restriction does not deprive such organizations of "members" that
can be solicited for donations to a separate segregated fund that makes contributions to candidates, a fund that, under our decision in National Right
to Work Committee, supra, must be established by all corporations wishing
to make such candidate contributions. National Right to Work requires
that "members" have either a "financial or organizational attachment" to
the corporation, 459 U. S., at 204 (emphasis added). Our decision today
merely states that a corporation may not have persons affiliated financially if it is to fall outside § 441b's prohibition on direct expenditures.

l
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in this case, Congress has chosen too blunt an instrument for
such a delicate task.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
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